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A B S T R A C T
Digital platforms are an organizational form made up of a technological architecture and governance me-
chanisms for managing autonomous complementors. A platform’s success depends on their engagement in value
creation and capture. Prior studies of such engagement have mainly focused on a platform’s governance me-
chanisms without recognizing their interdependence to its technological architecture. There is therefore a
limited understanding of how the interplay between governance and architecture configures platform organi-
zations, and why these configurations produce different levels of complementor engagement. In this paper, our
analysis of a 12-year study of a shared platform initiative yields three configurations of platform organizations:
vertical, horizontal, and modular. Based on these configurations, we develop propositions that theorize the
implications of these organizational forms for complementor engagement. We further propose that these in-
sights, which we derive from a shared platform, are particularly relevant for blockchain-based platforms.
1. Introduction
Digital platforms1 as an emergent organizational form (Gawer,
2014; Nambisan et al., 2017) are characterized by (1) technology: a
technological architecture constituted of a modular core, standardized
interfaces, and complementary extensions (e.g., Baldwin and Woodard,
2009; Karhu et al., 2018), and (2) social processes: a set of governance
mechanisms to manage an ecosystem of independent complementors
who complete the platform’s value proposition by co-creating its value
(e.g., Adner, 2017; Nambisan, 2017). By mediating the interactions
among such complementors, platforms afford multi-sided markets that
are an indispensable part of our contemporary economy (Ceccagnoli
et al., 2012; Lusch and Nambisan, 2015).
Especially in industries characterized by network effects, a plat-
form’s value proposition depends on complementors to enact and
evolve it (e.g., de Reuver et al., 2018; Parker et al., 2017). However, it
is challenging for platform organizations to “discover and implement a
complex value proposition via an innovation ecosystem while also en-
suring that it will benefit from the fruits of the collective effort” (Dattée
et al. 2018, p. 470). Securing complementor engagement, i.e., com-
plementors’ contribution of value-adding complementarities and their
compliance with the platform’s rules and processes (Jacobides et al.,
2018), is thus the most critical success factor of such organizations (e.g.,
Boudreau, 2012; Eaton et al., 2015).
Previous platform research highlights that managing complementor
engagement is rife with contradictions (Wareham et al., 2014). To
foster generativity (i.e., evolvability), the independence of com-
plementors, who work autonomously to satisfy customer needs, must be
promoted and facilitated (Huber et al., 2017; Song et al., 2018). To
create and maintain a coherent, shared identity for the platform (i.e.,
stability), however, complementors’ pursuit of their own interests must
be balanced with the interests of other players in the ecosystem (Eaton
et al., 2015; Parker et al., 2017). While there is ample research on the
challenge of balancing a platform’s stability with its evolvability
(Dattée et al., 2018; Tilson et al., 2010), it focuses predominantly on
governance mechanisms as the primary means for reconciling these
competing demands (Lindgren et al., 2015).
A platform’s technological architecture, however, represents an-
other key means to achieve complementor engagement (e.g., Tiwana,
2015a,b). For example, the modularity of the platform’s core has been
found to be an important determinant of positive network effects
(Pagani, 2013) in that it maximizes complementor independence and
creativity by ensuring the interoperability among components (e.g.,
Henfridsson et al., 2018). The platform architecture also has
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implications for its governance, simply because rights and rules may be
embedded in and thus enforced by the technology itself (Jacobides
et al., 2018; Nambisan, 2017).
There are few platform studies that explore the mutual inter-
dependence between architecture and governance, and that theorize its
implications for complementor engagement. The fact that most em-
pirical platform research deals with proprietary platforms, where access
to the platform’s evolution is limited and owners have made both ar-
chitectural and governance decisions prior to going live (Eisenmann
et al., 2011), seems to contribute to the current dearth of research on
the emergence of architecture-governance configurations and the levels
of complementor engagement they produce. Only a handful of recent
studies address shared platforms, which are developed and operated by
collectives of heterogeneous actors in a more transparent process (e.g.,
Jha et al., 2016). Since these studies largely rely on the reconstruction
of events from historical data, their ability to shed light on the mutual
shaping of technological architecture and governance mechanisms in
configuring platform organizations and engaging complementors is
constrained.
The configurational dynamics of technology and social practices in
platform ecosystems merit further attention. For example, platform
leaders’ decisions and choices regarding the relationship between the
degree of architectural openness and the allocation of decision rights do
not only shape the appeal and accessibility of complementor opportu-
nities provided by the platform, but also complementors’ perceived
uncertainty and their willingness to cope with it (Nambisan, 2017).
Questions of the mutual interdependence between technology archi-
tecture and governance mechanisms need to be examined to understand
how to optimize complementor engagement for platform success. To
this end, a longitudinal research design capable of tracing whether
mechanisms governing a platform ecosystem of complementors
“change as a function of the shifting nature of modularity” (Jacobides
et al., 2018, p. 2269) holds great promise.
In this paper, we take inspiration from work by Dattée et al. (2018),
Jacobides et al. (2018), and Jha et al. (2016) to develop new theoretical
insights into the interplay between architecture and governance in
configuring platform organizations that are capable of developing and
sustaining high levels of complementor engagement. Our research
question reads: How does the interplay between technological architecture
and governance mechanisms generate platform organizations that produce
different levels of complementor engagement?
To answer this question, we draw on data collected during a long-
itudinal 12-year (2002–2013) platform initiative in the Swedish road
haulage industry. The purpose of this project was to allow small road
haulage firms to integrate embedded, mobile, and stationary technol-
ogies. What emerged was a shared (Eisenmann, 2008) or a standard-
based platform (Markus and Bui, 2012) that was collectively developed
and governed by an industry consortium comprised of customers (i.e.,
road haulers) and complementors (i.e., software vendors and truck
manufacturers). Applying imbrication as a theoretical lens (Leonardi,
2011), our objective is to (i) identify and conceptualize architecture-
governance configurations that enact shared platforms, (ii) gain insight
into the interdependence of their technological and social dimensions,
and (iii) theorize the implications of these configurations for com-
plementor engagement. Notably, our focus on shared platforms offer us
the opportunity to develop insights relevant to blockchain platforms,
which are beginning to emerge as peer-based and more cost-effective
alternatives to proprietary platforms (Beck et al., 2018). As such, they
bear much resemblance to shared platforms.
2. Complementor engagement
Given that platform organizations are composed of an architectural
core that needs to be completed by third-parties’ contributions of per-
ipheral components that enhance its value (Boudreau, 2010,2012),
developing and maintaining complementor engagement is a critical
success factor for this form of organizing (Wareham et al., 2014). The
notion of complementor engagement captures a platform organization’s
goal to leverage the expertise and ingenuity of complementors, e.g., a
diverse developer community (Benlian et al., 2015; Ceccagnoli et al.,
2012), to create new capabilities that will realizing its generative po-
tential (de Reuver et al., 2018; Nambisan, 2017).
As rational actors, complementors strive for competitive differ-
entiation, focusing on their own portfolio of domain expertise, market
mechanisms, relational capital, and sector knowledge to create locally
relevant solutions. Yet, they must also contribute knowledge that ben-
efits the collective and ecosystem cohesion because, while moderate
competition tends to stimulate innovation, intense competition is likely
to undermine it (Boudreau, 2012). Platforms thus need to balance the
complementarity and competitiveness among complementors (de
Reuver et al., 2018), which implies managing the contradiction be-
tween a platform’s evolvability to foster generativity and its stability to
enable efficiency and complementors’ value capture (Wareham et al.,
2014; Sarker et al., 2012).
Past platform research has reported a positive correlation between
the number and heterogeneity of complementors and the variety of
complements a platform offers: the broader the range of complementors
that contribute components to the platform, the higher the likelihood
that it will follow a successful evolutionary path towards dominance
(Eisenmann et al., 2011; Jacobides et al., 2018). However, com-
plementor heterogeneity has also been found to lead to significant
variance in the quality of complements (Wareham et al., 2014).
While most platform research has prioritized governance as the
means for managing complementor engagement (e.g., Huber et al.,
2017; Sarker et al., 2012), some studies have begun to recognize “that
the choices about who ought to make what decisions are intertwined
with the architecture of the governed information technology artifact”
(Tiwana 2015b, p. 40). Table 1 provides a summary of literature that
explores platforms as configurations of architecture and governance
that have implications for the engagement of complementors.
The majority of these papers (11 out of 15) deal with proprietary
platforms (e.g., Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Karhu et al., 2018; Ozalp
et al., 2018). Since the platform owner develops the platform and thus
makes all technical decisions, these papers only concern themselves
with the interaction between the technical and the social in managing
complementor engagement after the platform is operational (Cennamo
et al., 2018).
For example, Ondrus et al. (2015) argue that governance mechan-
isms are particularly relevant once there exists a platform core whose
value proposition needs to be completed by complementor extensions;
however, it is the architectural core (the configuration of data access,
component interoperability, and core-extension coupling) that largely
determines a platform’s market potential prior to complementor en-
gagement. In contrast, Kazan et al. (2015) suggest that decisions about
platform access (direct, indirect, or open access), which determines
what value complementors can derive, are intrinsically related to ar-
chitectural choices made throughout the evolution of a platform.
Taking a similar perspective, Tiwana (2015b) argues that component
decoupling and interface standardization may reduce coordination
costs, but if the architecture is incongruent with complementors’ deci-
sion rights they are likely to eventually abandon a platform.
Only a few of these platform studies (The last four papers in Table 1)
consider shared platforms, i.e., efforts where multiple, independent
complementors jointly develop a platform organization over time. The
main challenge these collaboratively developed and maintained plat-
forms face is that the competitive dynamics among complementors are
present from the platform’s inception and are likely to shape not only
the technical design of the platform, but also its governance mechan-
isms. Additionally, the history of interaction among the com-
plementors, as well as the governance mechanisms employed to co-
ordinate the stakeholders during the development efforts, have
implications for complementors’ willingness to commit their resources
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Table 1
Papers that explore platforms as configurations of architecture and governance.
Characteristics
Articles Platform Architecture Governance Contribution
Cennamo et al.
(2018)
Videogame consoles requiring
proprietary language coding by
complement developers
Modular, layered architectures
comprised of technology core
and interfaces create different
levels of integration complexity
Developing products for
multiple platforms (i.e.,
multihoming) affects
competition between platform
owners and complementors
Strategic and technical
parameters must be
considered to explicate the
dynamics of platform
evolution
Wareham et al.
(2014)
Technology ecosystems include
core components made by a
platform owner and
complements developed by
autonomous firms in the
periphery
Layered architecture with
loosely or tightly coupled
interfaces (i.e., architectural
control points) between core
components and complements
Cultivating an ecosystem of
complementors for generativity
by reconciling the paradox of
change (i.e., stability versus
evolvability)
Governance mechanisms for
managing tensions pertinent
to technology ecosystems
Tiwana (2015b) Software platforms are created
by a single platform owner and
serve as an extensible
technological foundation on top
of which outside firms can build
applications
Modularized architecture that
minimizes interdependence
between subsystems allowing
them to change independently
yet to interoperate
Viewing decision rights and
architecture as a system of
interlocked choices that jointly
influence coordination cost
Implications of the interplay
between decision rights and
architectural configurations
(i.e., component decoupling
and interface
standardization)
Kapoor and
Agarwal
(2017)
Business ecosystems
orchestrated by a single
platform owner setting the rules
for complementors
Technical architecture
comprised of components (or
subsystems) that interact with
complementors’ products
Managing structural (i.e.,
technological interdependence)
and evolutionary (i.e.,
technology transitions) features
of an ecosystem shapes value
appropriation among
complementors
Varying levels of ecosystem
complexity lead to trade-offs
that platform owners and
complementors must
reconcile over time
Karhu et al. (2018) Open digital platforms hosted
by a single firm inviting third-
parties to contribute
improvements and add
complements
Architecture modules with
standardized interfaces that can
be combined to generate
alternative products and
platform features
Designing boundary resources
so that they maximize
generativity and minimize
exploitation (i.e., forking)
Platform ecosystems are
hostile competitive
environments that demand
proactive defense strategizing
Kazan et al. (2018) Digital platforms include an
owner and complementors
cocreating firm-specific
components that render valued
derivates
Technical architecture made up
of modular components that
third-parties exploit for value
creation
Configuring architectures is a
means for platform-driven
strategic groups to bolster their
competitiveness
Integrative and integratable
architectures offer direct,
indirect, or open access to
distribute value among actors
Ondrus et al.
(2015)
Multi-sided platforms governed
by an organization that creates
value by enabling interactions
between two (or more) distinct
types of customers
Set of stable components that
supports variety and
evolvability by constraining
linkages among the other
components
Striking the right level of
platform openness is imperative
to maximize market potential
and likelihood of subsequent
success
Strategic decision model that
helps to verify whether a
platform satisfies necessary
openness conditions of
ignition
Ozalp et al. (2018) Videogame consoles owned by
a product maker orchestrating a
population of game developers
Modularized technical
architecture that demands
specialized programming
language through its interfaces
Balancing the trade-off between
platform capabilities and
complementor challenges
through architectural design
and routine invention
Interdependence between
technological transitions and
their impact on
complementors disrupts
value creation in ecosystems
Pagani (2013) Multi-sided platforms managed
by a single actor who control
functional components to
organize edge and core
competencies of ecosystem
players
Component-based architecture
that affords value creation and
capture in digital ecosystems
Configuring control points
enables implementation of
functional components required
to deliver a service offering
Strategy insights about the
dynamic process by which
two-sided markets and
supportive platform solutions
emerge
Parker et al.
(2017)
Digital platforms are governed
by an individual firm
interacting with an ecosystem
of external developers
Layered architecture of digital
technology that includes
device, network, service, and
content layers
Influencing developer
innovation through platform
resources and licensing
agreements
Platform firms maximize
growth by optimizing their
own intellectual property
regimes
Song et al. (2018) Two-sided platform markets
characterized by a software
firm orchestrating both end-
users and third-party
developers that supply
complementary apps
Technological architecture that
includes extensible codebases
of software systems that
provide core functionalities
Shaping the mutual influences
between the app-side and the
user-side of software platforms
Governance implications of
the temporal dynamics that
underlie the interdependence
between the two sides of a
platform
Spagnoletti et al.
(2015)
Digital platforms provide a
socio-technical foundation
upon which diverse actors can
develop complementary
products, technologies, or
services
Layered modular architecture
comprised of core and
peripheral components and
interfaces linking them to
complements
Devising coordination
mechanisms that build on
mutual, reciprocal adjustments
as well as hierarchical and
formal control
Propositions that help to
design and implement core
elements, interfaces, and
complements of digital
platforms
Jacobides et al.
(2018)
Interorganizational systems
stipulating agreed and
predefined ways of interaction
Technological modularity
mediated by rules of
engagement, standards, and
codified interfaces
Tying ecosystem members
together in a web of
interdependent yet autonomous
activities (i.e., coordination
without hierarchy)
Role of modularity and
impact of different types of
complementarities
(continued on next page)
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to the platform once it is operational. While architectural features of the
platform, e.g., modularity, create the conditions for smooth coordina-
tion (Jacobides et al., 2018), governance remains key to the develop-
ment of shared platforms, as it provides processes for how to resolve
conflict and encourage alignment through rules of engagement (Jha
et al., 2016). Furthermore, as the value capture opportunities for
complementors evolve in a shared platform, governance mechanisms
need to respond more dynamically to the technical and social shifts in
collaborative development contexts (Dattée et al., 2018).
3. Platform organizations
Consistent with Gawer (2014), we argue that technology archi-
tecture and mechanisms for governing the ecosystem of complementors
make up the organizational form that is the platform. However, to
understand how architecture and governance intertwine to become
platform organizations, we need to conceptualize each of these ele-
ments in turn.
3.1. Technology architectures
Tiwana et al. (2010) highlight that a platform’s technological ar-
chitecture comprises three components: (1) a core, (2) interfaces, and
(3) complementary modules that expand the core’s functionality. This
definition draws on Baldwin and Clark’s (2000) general principles of
modular systems design, which stipulate that systems have modules
whose design parameters are hidden (encapsulated core modules) and
visible design rules that facilitate inter-module interaction (specified
interfaces). While the core is the hidden layer of a platform’s archi-
tecture, the interface is made publicly accessible (Baldwin and
Woodard, 2009; Karhu et al., 2018).
The architectural core, which constitutes “one component of, or
subsystem of, an evolving technological system when it is strongly
functionally interdependent with most of the other components of the
system” (Gawer and Henderson 2007, p. 4), acts as a mediating device,
transferring messages between disparate parts of the platform. To
qualify as a core, it “should perform at least one essential function … or
solve an essential problem within an industry” (Gawer and Cusumano
2008, p. 29) and, at a minimum, it needs to broker communications
between two entities by means of such functions as user registration,
message addressing, and message validation. The core is made acces-
sible to other, possibly third-party, modules through an interface, which
is the de-facto standard of interoperability among platform com-
plementors (Boudreau, 2010,2012). Hence, the interface acts as a
“treaty between two or more sub-elements” (Baldwin and Clark 2000,
p. 73) that forces module developers to format their input and output
parameters in ways that other modules can readily send messages to
and receive messages from the focal module (Baldwin and Woodard,
2009).
The quality of a platform’s architecture can be evaluated according
to two key measures: the modules’ synergistic specificity and the con-
formability of the core-periphery interface (e.g., Sanchez and Mahony,
1996). The former measures a platform’s architectural modularity in
terms of the degree of dependence between the core and extension
modules. To achieve low synergistic specificity, i.e., loose coupling,
core modules must be more general, reusable, and re-combinable
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). High synergistic specificity, i.e., tight
coupling, implies that extension modules are highly specific to core
modules (Schilling, 2000). While an architecture characterized by
higher synergistic specificity typically generates a more uniform user
experience (as different modules are specifically designed to work to-
gether), lower synergistic specificity enables generativity because ex-
tension developers can act more independently and are able to pursue
their own self-interest.
A highly conformable interface is clearly specified, unambiguous,
stable, well documented, and standardized (Tiwana, 2015a). Table 2
summarizes each of these dimensions. Platform providers may offer
configuration tools, such as software development kits, schemas or
templates to increase the conformability of an interface by helping
complementor technologies comply with the architecture standards
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). While high interface conform-
ability makes it easier for complementors to adapt to the core archi-
tecture, the degree to which they conform to a platform’s prescribed
interface specifications can vary considerably (Tiwana, 2015a). For this
reason, governance is needed.
3.2. Governance mechanisms
Governance has a prominent role in the extant platform literature (e.g.,
Adner, 2017; Benlian et al., 2015; Svahn et al., 2017), in large part because
complementors are rational actors whose interests are frequently mis-
aligned with those of the platform owner and the other complementors,
with whom they compete (Yoffie and Kwak, 2006). If left ungoverned,
complementors with higher status (e.g., producers of best in class products
and/or with large install bases) are likely to dominate the platform, which
makes it less attractive to other complementors (Wareham et al., 2014).
This ultimately constrains network effects (e.g., Zhu and Ianisti, 2012).
Hence, a key goal of governance mechanisms is to offer complementor
incentives to align the various stakeholders’ interests (Kapoor and
Agarwal, 2017; Song et al., 2018). Table 3 summarizes the governance
mechanisms prior platform research has identified.
Governance mechanisms in shared platforms typically revolve around
granting authority over control points to platform actors, and ensuring
compliance with the platform’s objectives and rules (Huber et al., 2017;
Tiwana et al., 2010). Granting authority implies allocating decision-
making rights over the control points in the platform (locations in an ar-
chitecture that determine a platform’s greatest value or power) to com-
plementors and the platform owner (Dattée et al., 2018; Pagani, 2013).
Table 1 (continued)
Characteristics
Articles Platform Architecture Governance Contribution
Dattée et al.
(2018)
Industry platforms building on
shared standards and interfaces
Layered digital infrastructures
that include lower-level layers
(e.g., physical components) and
user-facing layers (e.g.,
applications)
Balancing value creation and
capture characterizes the
ecosystem game between
initiators and other actors
Generativity of an enabling
technology is leveraged by
dynamic control points that
distribute the generation of
alternatives to suitable actors
Jha et al. (2016) Technology-enabled
ecosystems assembling
components from various actors
Modularized infrastructure
based on loosely coupled
integration
Aligning components of an
ecosystem so that they
influence each other and evolve
into integrative innovation
Stakeholders create value for
themselves when they
increase the collective pool of
human, economic, and
material resources
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Different sets of decision rights should be allocated in a way that the cost
of coordinating and safeguarding the resources can be recouped by the
value co-created through the platform (e.g., Tiwana, 2015b). To this end,
intellectual property protections and other legal rights of exclusion may
either be granted or denied (Benlian et al., 2015).
Ensuring complementors’ compliance entails that platform provi-
ders “craft rules and shape the process of ecosystem development to tie
in complements and make complementors abide to them” (Jacobides
et al., 2018, p. 2263). This governance mechanism requires that the
platform’s values and the behaviors expected of complementors are
clearly articulated (Huber et al., 2017). Indeed, given the importance of
cross-side network effects to platform organizations, incentivizing
complementors to build products with the functionality and quality that
generate competitive advantage for the platform represents a key
management concern (Boudreau, 2010,2012; Song et al., 2018;
Wareham et al., 2014).
4. A configurational process perspective
The particular configuration that constitutes a given platform or-
ganization, evolves out of the interaction between its technological
architecture and governance mechanisms. The configuration, in turn,
determines the platform’s capability to produce and sustain com-
plementor engagement (Gawer, 2014). Even though some of the extant
literature highlights this interaction in the realm of proprietary plat-
forms (Tiwana, 2015b), studying emergent platform configurations and
their implications for complementor engagement in shared platforms
promises us particularly valuable insights into these relationships
(Dattée et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018).
The imbrication lens (Leonardi, 2011) is a process perspective that
allows us to track the mutual shaping of the technological (components,
interfaces) and social (processes, rules) aspects of a shared platform
over time. More specifically, its conceptual scaffold encourages the
bundling of social and material agency into distinct moments that shape
each other and, over time, configure the platform organizations through
the sedimentation of socio-material practices into an infrastructure.
This perspective maintains that human agency (the ability to act with
intentionality, motivation, and rationality) and technological agency
(“the capacity for nonhuman entities to act on their own, apart from
human intervention” (Leonardi 2011, p. 148)) form the building blocks
of practice. When human and technological agencies are put together
(i.e., imbricated) into an interlocking, overlapping arrangement, they
create technologies and routines (“sequential patterns of social action”
(Leonardi 2011, p. 148)). These, in turn, imbricate to form an organi-
zational configuration, whose arrangement determines whether the
technology is seen as either affording or constraining users in their
efforts to exercise their agency.
Furthermore, the imbrication perspective theorizes that the con-
figuration of human and material agency also determines whether
people will change the technology or change their routines. When the
technology is regarded as an affordance, i.e., an action possibility for a
specific user in a specific context (Gibson, 2014), a sequence of im-
brications that changes what people do, is set in motion. For example, a
modular platform architecture that enables generativity affords custo-
mers a choice among components and how they are combined. This,
however, results in a change of governance from a hierarchical, top-
down mechanism to a more egalitarian, collaborative one (Jacobides
et al., 2018).
In contrast, when the technology is perceived as a constraint, a se-
quence of imbrications that changes the technology is generated.
Taking Mozilla’s Firefox as an example, extensions (add-ons) that ex-
hibited a low degree of modularization constrained the evolution of
both complements and the overall ecosystem (Tiwana, 2015a). In re-
sponse, Firefox devised a four-step screening routine (governance pro-
cess) that permitting only quality extensions to be added to the plat-
form. Any problem identified in the screening process needed to be
corrected by the complementor before Firefox performed its screening
yet again.
5. Research design
Our research is based on a 12-year (2002–2013) shared platform
initiative within the Swedish road haulage industry. The purpose of the
project was to develop collectively a new standard-based platform for
integrating data from the three islands of technology on which road
haulers relied: stationary enterprise systems, mobile applications, and
vehicle-embedded systems. The project was designed as action research
and drew on established traditions within the IS discipline. Its approach
was problem-solving dominant in that it endeavored to generate and
analyze interesting insights that emerged during decision making ac-
tivities (Lindgren et al., 2004). Given our case study method, we seek to
generalize from our empirical material to theory, rather than general-
izing to the population of shared platforms (Lee and Baskerville, 2003).
Also, the account presented in this paper reflects one of the many
possible theoretical trajectories that was identified during the multi-
year effort of abductive theorizing (Locke et al., 2008), which has
benefitted from a grounded engagement with the empirical material
and the platform literature.
5.1. Case study
Road haulers’ field operations rely on embedded technologies and
mobile devices to coordinate work with headquarters that use en-
terprise systems for route management and cost control (Andersson and
Lindgren, 2005; Lindgren et al., 2008). Table 4 presents a summary of
these three major classes of technology that operate in a typical road
haulage firm.
However, the lack of an industry-specific, standardized shared
platform meant that it was difficult for the Swedish road haulers to
digitalize their processes and thereby gain the efficiencies they needed
to compete in an increasingly open logistics market that brought more
and larger international trucking companies (e.g., DHL, Schenker) to
the country. Moreover, the proprietary integration solutions that most
haulers had invested in over time not only created lock-in effects that
produced inefficiencies within individual firms, but they also hindered
inter-organizational collaboration that promised optimized fleet utili-
zation and reduced CO2 emissions (Lindgren et al., 2008).
A shared platform initiative was born in 2002 to help the relatively
small, heterogeneous, and independent Swedish road haulers remain
competitive by means of frictionless transactions and greater informa-
tion transparency across a diversity of technologies. The Mobile-
Stationary Interface (MSI) initiative can be classified as an industry
effort aimed at facilitating smooth coordination of transport processes
both within and across road haulage firms. Besides improving the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of the haulers’ operations, the platform in-
itiative sought to generate new digital options and business opportu-
nities for technology vendors.
5.2. Data collection
The MSI project2 was initially led by the Viktoria Institute (a re-
search-focused consulting organization) whose customers included
mostly transport companies and automobile manufacturers. The trans-
port industry network that Viktoria Institute coordinated, was com-
prised of fourteen technology vendors, two truck manufacturers, a
number of road haulage firms, and a consulting organization owned by
fifteen Swedish transport organizations (see Table 5 for a classification
2 VINNOVA (Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems), Swedish ICT (research
institute group), MSI Group, and the participating organizations funded the
project.
F. Saadatmand, et al. Research Policy 48 (2019) 103770
5
of the participating actors).
The industry actors brought considerable experience with em-
bedded, mobile, and stationary technology to the project, while the
action researchers brought expertise in design-oriented action research
(Lindgren et al., 2004), as well as in embedded and mobile computing
infrastructures (Henfridsson and Lindgren, 2005). Although Viktoria
Institute initiated the project, the authority was assigned to a team of
practitioners and researchers once the Client-Researcher Agreement
(Davison et al., 2004) was signed in 2003. Throughout the different
stages of the project, authority and control shifted among the partici-
pants, with more weight being given to industry interests over time.
However, the second author served as coordinator to a greater or lesser
extent until the MSI’s modularized platform architecture was completed
by the fall of 2012 (see Table 6 for its main components).
Data were generated throughout the twelve years of the MSI plat-
form initiative. The data included formal interviews, participation in
planning meetings and workshops, and documents ranging from e-mails
through strategy and technical documents to press releases.
Additionally, interviews with MSI members who had played key roles in
the initiative were conducted in 2016 to gain an appreciation of the
platform initiative’s longer-term implications (see Table 7 for a sum-
mary of data sources).
5.3. Data analysis
We followed an abductive approach to data analysis and theory
building (Locke et al., 2008), which involved (1) applying an estab-
lished theory, (2) observing a surprise in the empirical phenomenon in
light of the theory, and (3) articulating a new theory that resolves the
surprise (Alvesson and Karreman, 2007). We fulfilled these steps
iteratively by moving back and forth between data and theory. Next, we
describe how the concepts, categories, and their relationships that we
report here, surfaced.
Our analysis commenced by reading and re-reading the empirical
material and arranging the events into increasingly coherent narratives.
This temporal organizing (see Fig. 1) highlighted that the MSI project
exhibited three distinct phases of development, each of which resulted
in a distinct platform organization (i.e., architecture-governance con-
figuration). Drawing on the architectural features of each platform, we
labelled the phases Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi), Web Ser-
vices (WS), and Business Process Modules (BPM) respectively.
These distinct evolutionary phases afforded constant comparison.
During this grounded sensemaking, the co-authors’ conceptual under-
standing of platforms played an integral role in categorization. We, the
co-authors, toggled between reviewing the platform literature to gen-
erate ideas of what concepts and theories might help explain the MSI
initiative’s evolution, and the re-reading of the data through the prism
of the newly identified concepts. Leveraging concepts that emerged as
being fundamental to platforms as organizational forms, we coded the
data in Atlasti 7 into categories that clustered into three overarching
constructs: technology architecture, governance mechanisms, and
complementor engagement. Interviews, meetings, workshops, email
conversations, project reports, grant applications, and developer notes
were all categorized according to such codes as synergistic specificity,
interface conformability, data security, intellectual property rights,
decision rights, control points, platform ownership, and competition/
cooperation. To assess complementors’ engagement, we coded behavior
such attending meetings and workshops, engaging in technology de-
velopment, and marketing the initiative. In total, we coded the data
into 11 categories. In addition, we explored the inter-complementor
relationships to understand how cooperative and competitive com-
plementors were in each of the three phases.
Based on a gap we perceived in the platform literature, namely
understating the interaction of technology architecture and governance
mechanisms over time, we explored process theories that focused on
how the technical and social aspects of organizations mutually shape
each other. We settled on the theory of imbrication (Leonardi, 2011) as
it lent considerable support for analyzing longitudinal data. Our goal
was to understand the reciprocal configuring of architecture and gov-
ernance into somewhat stable organizational forms, and their implica-
tions for complementor engagement. After much back-and-forth be-
tween the imbrication model and the data, a stable picture of the MSI
platform’s evolution as shifts in its architecture-governance configura-
tions emerged (Fig. 2).
6. Empirical findings
Applying the imbrication perspective to each of the three phases of
the MSI shared platform initiative, we now present our findings in three
imbricational pairs (see Fig. 2). For each, we identify how the material
(architecture) and human (governance mechanisms) agencies re-
ciprocally shaped the platform’s organizational form and with what
implications for complementor engagement.
Table 2
Dimensions of technological architectures.
Technological architecture design
characteristics
Definition Reference
High/low synergistic specificity Synergistic specificity refers to the degree of coupling between the platform core and its
complements (i.e., periphery). Extension modules that are highly specific to core modules, exhibit
high synergistic specificity. For these extension modules to function, complementor developers and
core developers need to exchange more information about the specifications of the systems on both
sides. This endangers information hiding on both sides.
Sanchez and Mahony (1996),
Schilling (2000)
Low/high interface conformability This conformability of the core’s interface is achieved if it is:
• Clearly specified i.e., functions and parameters have self-explanatory, consistent names.• Unambiguous i.e., related concepts are named unambiguously. It should be easy to associate the
names with the right concepts without looking them up in the documentation.
• Well-documented i.e., datatypes specs, function specs, and an introduction document that binds
the whole into a logical entity exists.
• Stable i.e., the object model is adaptable to future changes.• Standardized i.e., allows different technologies to work together, regardless of language and
design
If more than two of the 5 criteria are not satisfied, the interface has low conformability. A higher
interface conformability implies complementors can integrate their system to the platform without
the need for off-platform communication.
Sanchez and Mahony (1996),
Tiwana (2015a)
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6.1. Open Service Gateway initiative (OSGi) phase: January 2002 to April
2004
6.1.1. Imbrication #1: human → material
Back in the early 2000s, Swedish road haulage firms, most of whom
were small to medium-sized players that specialized in the material
they hauled (e.g., lumber, liquids), were faced with two key hurdles
when digitalizing their business processes: their lack of technological
expertise and a fragmented IT infrastructure comprised of best-in-class
embedded, mobile, and stationary systems that had been implemented
as isolated solutions over the years. Something as simple as calculating
the cost of a delivery had to be done manually by downloading,
matching, and manipulating data from these disparate systems. Road
haulers had therefore begun investing in custom-built system interfaces,
which were maintained by the vendor they had tasked with developing
integration solutions. These interfaces were fragile and unstable;
changes in one vendor’s systems could disrupt the data flow.
Overall, many small road haulers felt they were at the mercy of
powerful actors like truck manufacturers who frequently made changes
to their embedded systems, thus forcing changes in the haulers’ IT in-
frastructures:
“The truck manufacturers keep trying to create new needs and
convince us to invest in their proprietary stuff. They equip the truck
with lots of new things and then they expect us to use it. I’ve no idea
what we can expect to get from it. I’m sure we’ll soon reach a point
of no return where we’re no longer interested in buying their in-
creasingly digitalized trucks.” (transport business manager in one of
the road haulage firms)
The animosity haulers felt towards the truck manufacturers con-
tributed to the haulers’ fragmented IT infrastructures in that they
sought out niche IT vendors who were willing to accommodate their
unique needs:
“The technology vendors can be categorized into two groups. The
big players are the truck manufacturers… they’ve dominated so far.
Then we have small niche firms that utilize emerging technologies
to develop novel solutions. Road haulers are suspicious of the truck
manufacturers due to their brand-specific thinking so they find the
smaller vendors to be a bit more flexible… these vendors do what it
takes to convince the haulers to implement their specific products.”
(manager director of Vehco)
Table 3
Mechanisms for ecosystem governance.
Governance mechanism Components Quotes
Granting authority Developing resource safeguards (e.g., IP
agreements, patents)
” Managers should protect against two types of IP-related claims on platform value. In the first, a party
asserts patent infringement …A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on
many different patented technologies.” Eisenman (2008, p. 47)
Allocating decision rights ”Decision rights partitioning refers to how decision making authority is divvied between the platform
owner and module developers. Decision rights simply refer to who has the authority and responsibility
for making specific decisions.” Tiwana et al. (2010, p. 679)
Allocating control points ” To prevent control becoming episodic and fleeting, organizations will need to install control points
into a nascent system and to strategically navigate the process of discovering value creation to ensure
eventual value capture.” Dattée et al. (2018, p. 490)
Ensuring compliance Aligning the incentives between the
platform’s buy- and sell-sides
“governance policies that are considered to be advantageous for the platform owner may impose
mutual adaptation challenges for other ecosystem participants. For example, despite the benefits of
platform updates, the process of releasing updates too frequently may inevitably disrupt the smooth
interactions across sides. ” Song et al. (2018, p. 137)
Aligning complementor incentives “In these conditions of large-scale collective creativity, it is important to establish incentives for
members to invest in complementary innovations—that is, to work together in assembling different
capabilities and expertise to create effective and holistic solutions for clients.” Wareham et al. (2014,
p. 4)
Openly communicating governance costs ”The effort borne by the partners arising from planning, adapting, and safe guarding the resources
contributed to the partnership” Huber et al. (2017, p. 567)
Monitoring output “the focus of control levers is not limited to output quality but should also address issues of overall
complement quantity, the distribution of complementor efforts across heterogeneous market niches,
the frequency of complement releases, and other managerial decisions that directly or indirectly
influence the quality, character, distribution, and availability of complement supply.” Wareham et al.
(2014, p. 4)
Table 4
Three major classes of technology operating in road haulage firms.
Class Infrastructure Functionality
Embedded systems: aimed at improving the efficiency of
vehicles/drivers
Active ignition sensing software
Barcode scanners
CAN-bus
GPS receiver
RFID technology
Trip recording software
Breaking and shifting behavior analysis
Driver working time analysis
Driving and stopping times tracking
Fuel consumption and trip distance monitoring
Information about mobile workers’ positions
Maintenance planning
Navigation support
Mobile systems: aimed at improving the efficiency of
mobile workers
Nomadic devices in cockpit (coupled to vehicle electronics)
Vehicle-mounted communication terminals (share platform
with vehicle-centric applications)
Vehicle communication between stationary personnel
and mobile workers
Remote access to stationary planning systems
Text messaging
Stationary systems: aimed at improving the efficiency of
dispatchers/managers
Geographical information systems
Fleet management applications (integrated with ERP
software)
Event-triggered alerts and geo-fencing
Geo-positioning
Order management
Route optimization
Cargo and vehicle monitoring and tracking
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Into this fractious market stepped Vehco, a university-sponsored
start-up in embedded IT, which positioned itself as a service provider
capable of helping road haulers to improve their competitiveness and to
develop environmentally sustainable business practices. Having just
completed a study of haulers’ IT requirements and the competitive
landscape of the IT vendors serving the industry, Vehco had developed
a prototype (EcoHauler) that instantiated an industry platform for in-
tegrating embedding, mobile, and stationary systems.
EcoHauler generated not only reports that calculated per-delivery
costs, but also provided a calculation of emissions per delivery. To get
embedded data from the truck, telematics service providers like Vehco
had two options: rely on the Fleet Management System (FMS) standard
to access the parameters that the truck manufacturers made available or
derive data by reverse engineering the truck’s CAN-bus. Like other
telematics firms (e.g., Transics), Vehco opted for the latter because the
data provided through the FMS standard was very limited and not
sufficiently up-to-date, which ultimately constrained the ability of
third-parties to innovate:
“We looked into FMS very early [when it was released] in all brands:
Iveco, Mercedes, Scania, and Volvo. But we got concerned about the
errors it had especially in displaying fuel consumption… [Now] we
have collaboration with Drivec… [a company that] takes the data
directly from the CAN-BUS.” (manager director of Transics)
The truck manufacturers voiced their opposition to this apparent
hack, claiming that it compromised the integrity – and thus the safety –
of their vehicles:
“What [Vehco] did was actually bad installations… they were pig-
gybacking on the CAN. It made the CAN network function im-
properly and in some cases this even caused accidents. We didn’t see
this as a major problem, but still you don’t want someone else to
play with the nerves in your heart.” (Global Telematics Manager,
Volvo Trucks)
Even though Volvo Trucks regarded the EcoHauler prototype as a
warranty infringement, it did not pursue legal action. Given Vehco’s
start-up status and its commitment to helping the small road haulers in
Sweden increase their efficiency and environmental sustainability, a
law suit would have generated negative publicity for the truck manu-
facturer. Still, the hostility between the telematics providers and the
truck manufacturers was palpable, especially as truck manufacturers
were developing their own telematics offerings.
In May 2002, Vehco and Viktoria Institute’s Telematics Group jointly
instigated the MSI platform initiative. Recognizing that they needed par-
ticipation from key players in the road haulage industry, its project leaders
decided to present the EcoHauler prototype to industry players in an effort
to make the initiative’s objectives more tangible and, by eliciting haulers’
viewpoints, to align the incentives between the platform’s buy- and sell-
sides. The two seminars (held in fall 2002) generated considerable interest
among the members of the Swedish Road Haulage Association (SRHA). In
addition, many of the IT vendors signed up to collaborate on the platform
development, partly to ensure the compatibility of their own solutions
with the evolving platform, and partly to remain apprised of – and possibly
to affect – shifts in the competitive landscape. By summer 2003, about a
dozen industry players were members of the MSI initiative. Besides
Viktoria Institute, Vehco, Gatespace, and a number of road haulers, the
founding members of the shared platform initiative were software vendors
Hogia, Prolog, Transics, and NL Partner as well as the truck manufacturers
Scania and Volvo Trucks.
At the time, Gatespace, a telematics solutions vendor, was pro-
moting OSGi (Open Service Gateway initiative) as an open platform
architecture that afforded integration of road haulers’ systems. It was
also collaborating with Volvo Trucks to develop a solution that used
CAN bus data to analyze driver work time. For these reasons, Gatespace
was keen to participate in the MSI project. The OSGi architecture al-
lowed software vendors to deploy a large array of wide-area-network
services by providing a framework to integrate disparate embedded,
mobile, and stationary systems. This made it a viable option to respond
to the haulers’ integration needs. Indeed, given that OSGi had already
been used to develop some open platform initiatives in the telematics
domain, and specifically in Volvo Trucks, the MSI project leaders
decided to adopt this architecture for the platform development.
Table 5
Classification of MSI platform complementors.
Actor category Actor names
Embedded technology provider Truck manufacturer Volvo, Scania
Vehicle Telematics Vehco, Gatespace Telematics, Drivec, Transics/BNT
Mobile technologies provider DPS, Pocket Mobile, Mobistics, MobiOne, CyberCom, Consafe Logistics, Barkfors, Systeam, Halda
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system provider NL Partner (later Locus Scandinavia), Hogia, IBS, Prolog, Transware, Netlink
Table 6
MSI platform components.
Component Description
Communication architecture There was no central messaging function (i.e., central server or address directory) so each IT system implementing the standard carried its own
namespace with unique addresses within the local domain. Combined with the domain name, these addresses were globally unique.
XML-based interface The XML root element was ‘message’, which included the actual information content of the MSI message as well as meta information necessary for
message addressing and routing. Overall, the XML schema specified a limited domain terminology for communicating road haulage data between
embedded, mobile, and stationary IT systems (system-to-system communication). It was structured around formally agreed core objects that were
fixed in terms of content and relationships. In addition, the interface prescribed the document schemas and the conditional choreography of
document exchanges for road haulage processes comprising multiple parties.
Context schema This feature afforded IT vendors and road haulers alike the flexibility to adapt a subset of essential global parameters to their local and particular
integration requirements.
Business process modules The order management module dealt with order fulfillment, i.e., scheduling deliveries so that they occurred within the customer-specified time
frame and calculating the delivery costs of an order. The purpose of the resource management module was to store information about the hauler’s
heterogeneous array of resources that needed to be tracked and accounted for during an order’s fulfillment, e.g., staff, trucks, gasoline. Use cases
for the route optimization module included sequencing deliveries so that transportation costs were minimized, taking into consideration the
delivery window specified by the customer as well as traffic information. An extension of route optimization was the reroute module, which
afforded the dynamic, just-in-time recalculation of the optimal route as transport conditions changed, e.g., a road accident or mechanical
problems.
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6.1.2. Imbrication #2: material → human
OSGi’s framework ran on top of a Java virtual machine and it of-
fered a shared execution environment that installed, updated, and un-
installed applications (aka “bundles”). For software vendors to share
information with each other, they needed such bundles to send/receive
the data to/from a messaging service. The OSGi server provided an
interface for each such services, i.e., a piece of code that offered a
template of variables and functions that the service was supposed to
have. It also registered the service that a bundle had requested.
The OSGi architecture accomplished data integration as follows: (1)
Vendors implemented the data exchange protocol between their in-
ternal system and the OSGi bundle; (2) They loaded and installed the
JAR (Java Archive) file that included the OSGi bundles; (3) OSGi
bundle in the sender system read the data it needed out of the vendor’s
system by means of a global data structure; and (4) sent the data to the
OSGi server requesting a service to send the data; (5) The OSGi server
registered the service to send the data; (6) the service sent the data to
the requestor, and (7) the OSGi bundle sent the data to the requestor’s
system via a global data structure. Each vendor implemented sending
mechanisms where they were needed based on the function of their
systems (for example, an order handling system sent data about an
order when this order was changed). The information received was
configured at the hauler according to the integration rules.
The OSGi architecture was characterized by high synergistic specificity
between the platform core (i.e., OSGi server) and the extensions (i.e., IT
vendors’ systems). This meant that the IT vendors had to adapt their
systems to meet the specific requirements of the OSGi bundles, which
limited their systems’ reusability in other integration efforts. The need for
a JAR file on every complementor’s own infrastructure also raised security
concerns, simply because the OSGi server would be able to remotely access
and update this client-side file. Vendors were worried that the OSGi ar-
chitecture would compromise the integrity of their infrastructures.
Client-side OSGi bundles were also specific to a given IT com-
plementor’s infrastructure. With the data and functions in these bundles
not being standardized and with guidance on how to implement the
client-side bundles being limited, interface conformability was low.
OSGi proved a poor fit for a shared platform given its high core-ex-
tension synergistic specificity and low interface conformability. In this
situation, seeking to present the road haulers with a consistent and
robust user experience, Vehco (owner of EcoHauler) was tapped to
centrally operate and maintain the MSI platform. In other words, Vehco
was allocated the key control points of the platform’s core.
However, contemplating the implementation of the OSGi-based ar-
chitecture, MSI members became increasingly uneasy by this platform
configuration as it gave Vehco significant control. Specifically, Vehco
would mediate the customer-supplier relationships of all IT vendors
whose systems were being connected, ultimately threatening their
market position in two ways. First, as the platform operator, Vehco had
the hauler’s ear and was likely to become the representative of all
vendors. As a result of its centrality, Vehco would also be able to exert
control over the other vendors, potentially imposing its architectural
decisions onto them. The platform thus took on a vertical form (see
Fig. 3) with Vehco disintermediating between the platform com-
plementors to their customers.
Second, OSGi’s complex approach to data access management and
the security risk that it presented for the IT vendors that sought to use
the MSI platform, rendered this architecture unacceptable for com-
peting complementors:
Table 7
Summary of data sources.
Data sources Amount
Interviews 136 (Average: 80min)
Project meetings 30 (Average: 240min)
Work meetings 75 (Average: 120min)
Workshops 18 (Average: 300min)
Board meetings 17 (Average: 75min)
Emails (dealt exclusively with substantive issues) 267
Presentations (Word documents, power points) 83
Project applications 9
Decision letters 5
Strategy documents (IT vendors, MSI group) 32
Technical documents (IT vendors, MSI group) 21
System demonstrations 18
Standard applications 22
Environmental reports 14
Module specifications 12
Press releases 12
Popular press articles 11
Fig. 1. Timeline of MSI platform events.
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“You need so much control of the OSGi architectural solution.
Standardizing things in ways that everybody can understand is do-
able for sure, but implementing OSGi across all these suppliers of
technology you know would be like mission impossible… the data
access aspect is so complex to manage.” (Managing Director of Vehco)
The vertical platform organizations was abandoned due to the IT
vendors’ low commitment to pursuing the implementation of an OSGi-
based architecture that was mediated by a single, all-powerful operator
(challenging the power balance among complementors). However, the
network of customers and complementors did not disband; the colla-
borative efforts thus far had established the haulers’ problems as real
and as worthy of a solution.
6.2. Web Services (WS) phase: May 2004 to December 2009
6.2.1. Imbrication #3: human → material
To kick off the platform development effect anew, the members hired a
consultant to identify architectural alternatives. The truck manufacturers
emphasized that they preferred an architecture with a standardized in-
terface that could serve as a layer over their own embedded components
with read-only access to a limited set of CAN bus parameters (provided by
the FMS standard). Their high status in the shared platform initiative
meant that these demands effectively reduced the project scope to merely
integrating mobile and stationary systems. Examining custom integration
projects that MSI members had already implemented, the newly-engaged
consultant identified the architecture of the Pharos Mobile standard as the
most promising candidate for the shared platform. It was an interface that
had been developed for contractor haulers specializing in package de-
livery. However, these players were larger than the road haulers and they
executed routine and pre-defined transport assignments with little varia-
tion in information needs.
The Pharos Mobile architecture relied on XML messaging to in-
tegrate data across technologies and several MSI members were already
familiar with it. Its developer, e-Com Logistics, was therefore invited to
run a workshop for MSI members. While the members recognized the
merits of a messaging-based architecture, they nevertheless noted that
the Pharos Mobile message schemas (their content and structure) were
likely to require significant modifications:
“Developed by e-Com Logistics, the Pharos Mobile is a standard
specifically intended for transports carried out by contractors of
haulers. For us, the problem is that it’s too large, too detailed, but
yet too small… its focus simply is on cargo/package transports.”
(excerpt from workshop report)
In the summer of 2004, the MSI members concluded that it would
be easier to develop an architecture from scratch than to adapt Pharos
Mobile. However, they were committed to adopting XML (eXtensible
Markup Language) for their interface protocol and web services (WS) as
the architecture for the platform core. Most of them had experience
with WS and they were either already using XML as the data exchange
format or were trying to comply with it. Hogia (a vendor of stationary
technology) had considerable experience with WS-based mobile-sta-
tionary interoperability solutions and offered its XML message schema
to the MSI project. Hogia’s proprietary XML structure soon became the
starting point for the shared platform’s interface.
6.2.2. Imbrication #4: material → human
Communicating by means of the WS architecture was accomplished
as follows (see Fig. 4): (1) Both sender and receiver implemented the
code to communicate with the web service and to pack/unpack the XML
file. (2) The sender prepared the XML file that contained the required
data as specified by the MSI interface standard. (3) The sender sent the
XML file to the MSI webserver. (4) After assessing that the XML file
conformed to the MSI interface standards, the MSI web service sent an
acknowledgement to the sender. (5) The MSI web service then sent the
data to the requestor. (6a) Upon receipt of the XML file, the requestor
sent an acknowledgement to the web service, and (6b) unpacked the
XML file, extracting the data and transforming it into the recipient’s
own data structure.
Fig. 2. MSI platform’s evolution as architecture-governance configurations.
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This architectural design did not require complementors to install
and load any third-party modules on their infrastructure to connect to
the MSI platform. They simply had to incorporate the send and receive
tags into their system’s communication module to control what data
was transmitted in and out. This effectively decreased synergistic spe-
cificity (loose core-extension coupling), allowing complementors to
choose to which data requests to respond and with what data. Also,
rather than sharing a data structure with a foreign module at runtime,
vendors simply mapped their internal data structures to the XML
schema, which eliminated the domino effect of changes.
The standardized XML message format paved the way for a highly
standardized interface. The complementors’ prior experience with WS
also reduced the ambiguity surrounding the interface because they
understood how it was used and how it affected their data. However,
given that the XML standard contained numerous, vendor-specific
variants of parameters that were almost identical to each other, its in-
terface conformability was low. The flexibility of the XML context
schema and the ethos of equal opportunity that the governance me-
chanism of preventing complementor dominance had produced, en-
couraged the accommodation of numerous software vendors’ specific
needs, thus bloating and complexifying the interface.
Due to the modularity of the architecture, which demanded fewer
resources from IT vendors to implement, as well as the expectation that
every complementor could now act as an integrator on the platform’s
community-managed core (Fig. 4), the MSI initiative attracted many
new members. These included Consafe Logistics (a stationary provider)
and three mobile providers Barkfors, Cybercom, and Pocketmobile.
However, after the MSI members had been working with the MSI
XML data structures for about a year, the platform initiative came to an
abrupt and unanticipated halt in September 2005. Hogia, whose XML
standard had served as the baseline for the MSI’s new platform archi-
tecture, announced that wanted to shut down and sue the initiative due
to infringement of its intellectual property rights. In an email sent to the
Viktoria institute, the researchers were accused of misrepresenting the
scope of the platform initiative:
“When we were asked to share our experiences of standardization…
we assumed Viktoria was a research institute and therefore vo-
luntarily shared our material with the group. To my knowledge,
however, it wasn’t part of the agreed plan that Viktoria would then
present a standard that competed with us and other providers. …
Hogia would never give away something that someone else could
further developed into an alternative to our own product.”
IBS, a vendor of enterprise resource planning systems, offered the
following interpretation of Hogia’s reaction:
“Hogia still argues like… ‘we have our own integration solutions
and our own standard, so why would we take part in this effort?’ It’s
simply their business model and making specific solutions for each
and every customer firm is profitable for them. But then you think
what a standard actually means… it’s a solution that many use. IBS
has already done several integration solutions that build on MSI.”
(sales manager at IBS)
Other MSI members reacted similarly to IBS in response to Hogia’s
sudden pivot of commitment to the MSI platform, noting that the vision
of a unified platform would make all complementors better off:
“[The MSI platform] offers its members a competitive advantage
because it serves as a mechanism that neutralizes competition from
non-member firms. The more players are involved, the better it
works.” (Marketing Director of Pocketmobile, mobile computing vendor)
Signing a letter that contested Hogia’s claims, the remaining MSI
members united in opposition to its attempts to destroy the platform
initiative. They were more willing than ever to commit resources to the
development of a shared platform. Faced with the collective resistance
from the MSI members, Hogia eventually withdrew its impending legal
action. The MSI group’s governance strategy of preventing com-
plementor dominance by not granting a single player authority over the
control points that made up the architectural core created the condi-
tions for conflict between the MSI collective and an individual player
(e.g., Hogia), but also buoyed complementor engagement. It generated
a horizontal platform organization (Fig. 4) that afforded com-
plementors equal opportunities for value capture.
Following the aftermath of the Hogia incident, the shared platform
initiative was transformed into a commercial industry consortium,
called the Mobile Stationary Interface Group (MSIG), in fall 2007. It
was financed through member fees and it developed a formal
Fig. 3. OSGi architecture and associated platform organization structure.
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organizational structure with a board of directors, a strategy team, and
a technical committee. This reorganization was accompanied by safe-
guarding the group and its resources against claims related to in-
tellectual property infringement, which entailed formalizing the entity’s
legal status in a way that protected individual MSI member firms from
future legal action.
6.3. Business Process Module phase: January 2010 to June 2016
6.3.1. Imbrication #5: human → material
The establishment of the MSIG generated considerable attention in
the trade press and with a new-found energy, group members promoted
the initiative heavily at a series of national road transport events.
Increasingly they acknowledged that the emerging platform helped
them reduce the time and effort needed to connect different vendors’ IT
systems. A more synchronized architectural understanding among
vendors meant that even custom integration projects that did not use
the MSI platform benefited from their increased knowledge about one
another’s technologies. Hogia soon realized that the dynamics in this
industry vertical were changing significantly and it decided to return to
the shared platform initiative in orderhi son be left behind.
In addition to the technology providers, there were also major road
haulage firms that recognized the benefits of the MSI platform:
“The MSI standard is an absolute necessity for us to cope with future
market requirements. It allows us to spend more time on increasing
our market penetration, which will result in improved profitability
for ourselves and our customers. It can also help to neutralize (un-
wanted) competition in the marketplace by lowering switching costs
and thereby making technology components easier to replace.” (IT
director at Samfrakt, a large road haulage firm)
In early 2010, persuaded by the MSI platform’s favorable publicity,
one of the largest road haulers in Sweden, LBC Frakt Värmland, issued a
request for proposals to integrate its various systems using the MSI
platform. Given the size of the project, several MSI members bid on this
assignment, but their proposed solutions relied on proprietary inter-
faces rather than the new platform. After publicly communicating its
disappointment with the proposals, LBC Frakt Värmland eventually
selected two vendors on the mobile side and Locus Scandinavia for the
stationary part of its architecture and tasked them to capitalize on the
MSI platform. Unfortunately, the integration effort proved very chal-
lenging largely because of the WS’s architecture’s relatively low inter-
face conformability. LBC Frakt Värmland concluded that these pro-
blems constrained the integration solution too severely to further
pursue the MSI architecture. Instead the proprietary interface promoted
by one of the integration partners was used as a baseline to develop an
integration solution that was nevertheless MSI-compliant.
To address the MSI architecture’s perceived lack of usability, MSIG
decided to divide the MSI interface into modules that dealt with specific
business processes. The interface was decomposed into four modules:
the order management module dealt with scheduling deliveries so that
they occurred within the customer-specified time frame and with cal-
culating the delivery costs of an order; the resource management module’s
purpose was to store information about the hauler’s heterogeneous
array of resources that needed to be tracked and accounted for during
an order’s fulfillment; the route optimization module instantiated use
cases like sequencing deliveries so that transportation costs could be
minimized, taking the delivery window specified by the customer as
well as traffic information into consideration; and the reroute module
extended the route optimization module by affording the dynamic, just-
in-time recalculation of the optimal route as transport conditions
changed. Decision rights over each module would be granted to com-
plementors with expertise in the given module’s intended functionality.
6.3.2. Imbrication #6: material → human
Applying the logic of maximum reusability, MSIG divided the MSI
interface along horizontal and vertical lines (Fig. 5): (1) header tags
specifying the message (e.g., type, sender, receiver), were moved into a
‘general’ module, which all messages had to inherit to work on the MSI
core, and (2) XML tags specifying the parameters related to one of the
four business processes formed the ‘child’ modules.
The BPM interface was both more streamlined and broader in its
functionality than the WS-based architecture on which it was built.
Given the interface conformability issues of the latter, the re-design of
the XML message templates harmonized the interface, thus standar-
dizing the format and meaning of each variable. The simplification of
the interface, coupled with improved documentation, significantly in-
creased its conformability. Additionally, by limiting the design focus to
a specific business process, the parameter set expanded to support a
deeper and more meaningful representation of a business process. Many
of these new XML tags were anticipatory; demand for them had not yet
been expressed but was expected to emerge in future. The IT vendors
competing for the integration work in any one of the four business
process verticals were therefore afforded the opportunity to develop
new use cases around these new parameters. Notably, by creating a
loosely coupled architecture, increased modularization supported gen-
erativity.
Enabled by the openness of the more process-oriented BPM archi-
tecture, the increased indirect network effects motivated new entrants
with high quality offerings supportive of a specific business process to
join the platform ecosystem. MSIG received them with open arms as
these new members would contribute the necessary knowledge to
Fig. 4. Web Service architecture and associated platform organization structure.
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further develop the modules. However, their entry also meant greater
competition for incumbent MSI members in a given process vertical
(Fig. 5). One such new entrants was DPS whose route optimization
software had been recognized as having one of the best route optimi-
zation algorithms in Europe. Indeed, the MSI platform with its modular
architecture and the flexible integration it afforded, provided the con-
ditions for DPS to consider entering the Swedish road haulage market
for the first time:
“To be honest, I think everybody in road transport should have tried
to grab what we’re doing like fifteen years ago… But they haven’t so
that’s why MSI appears so interesting to us. Given the language it
offers and its focus on flexible technology integration, we eventually
get the leverage our product deserves. We need this standard to
reduce the barriers and materialize the plug and play vision… then
we’re all set and ready to go.” (DPS Managing Director)
While the order management module had been largely developed by
Locus for LBC Frakt and was therefore considered relatively complete,
the resource and re-route management modules were dependent on the
implementation of the order management and route optimization
modules. Although the order management module was deemed to play
the most central role in the road haulers’ integration requirements, the
route optimization module, buoyed by a renewed emphasis on en-
vironmental sustainability, became the focus of attention.
Despite DPS’s newcomer status in the MSIG ecosystem, they were
allocated design decision rights over key control points in the three
modules related to route optimization. This afforded the outsider firm
significant control and power over the development of the shared
platform. This governance mechanism of granting one actor authority
over a significant portion of control points in the route optimization
vertical had the support of all MSIG members who believed that the MSI
platform would benefit from DPS’s expertise. DPS embraced this lea-
dership position, believing that the quality of its offerings would
maintain its competitiveness:
“We actually welcome openly sharing our expertise. It’s likely it
would lead to potentially more business negotiations for us and I
expect us to win them all in the end. We’ve learned it takes a lot of
time and resources to develop an effective optimization engine, so I
guess others understand they’re well behind us… We’re therefore
not afraid competition would intensify in that way.” (DPS Managing
Director)
However, the completion of the route optimization modules ran
afoul of the truck manufacturers’ fundamental unwillingness to make
sensor data available beyond the requirements of the FMS standard. As
owners of the embedded data, they were in a position to limit the scope
of the MSI route optimization module, ultimately restricting the value
creation potential of IT vendors who leveraged the integration potential
of the shared platform. At this time, Volvo trucks was developing its
own route optimization module in-house. Once again refusing to co-
operate fully, Volvo Trucks and Scania decided to exit the MSIG. In
2011, they instead partnered with DHL to develop a shared platform
with similar goals to MSI.
The four business process modules were handed over to MSIG in late
2012. However, complementor engagement had continued to decline
after the truck manufacturer’s departure. With the truck manufacturers’
repeated refusal to make available embedded sensor data, the IT ven-
dors had become increasingly doubtful of the prospects of developing
innovative solutions for road haulers. They therefore made no effort to
push the diffusion of the modules for their integration projects.
Returning to the pre-MSI practice of building custom and proprietary
interfaces, however, their improved knowledge of other vendors’ sys-
tems made it more feasible to implement their own integration solu-
tions at competitive rates. Moreover, many IT vendors were increas-
ingly aware that the MSI platform was not readily reusable in other
settings, making it difficult for them to recoup their investment in the
shared platform, especially in light of the small size of the Swedish road
hauler market. Given these overwhelming odds, the MSIG’s board of
directors decided to terminate the platform initiative in spring 2013.
7. Discussion
The objective of our study is to explore the following research
question: How does the interplay between technological architecture and
governance mechanisms generate platform organizations capable of produ-
cing different levels of complementor engagement? To answer this question,
we relied on insights from the platform literature, particularly about
architecture (Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010) and
governance (Huber et al., 2017; Wareham et al., 2014), and imbrication
as a process theory (Leonardi, 2011) to theorize a longitudinal case
study of the development of an industry-wide shared platform
(Eisenmann, 2008; Markus and Bui, 2012) in the Swedish road haulage
industry. Given that we sought an understanding of the reciprocal
shaping of technology architecture and governance mechanisms in
configuring platform organizations and these configurations’ implica-
tions for complementor engagement (Dattée et al., 2018; Gawer, 2014;
Jacobides et al., 2018), the collaborative MSI platform development
proved invaluable in that data about its evolution was available for our
process analysis.
Through the imbrication analysis we scrutinized the emergence of
architecture-governance configurations, which yielded three distinct
types of platform organizations: vertical, horizontal, and modular. A
vertical platform is an organizational form that builds on a technology
architecture that exhibits high core-extension coupling and allocates
decision rights over key control points to a single ecosystem com-
plementor. This complementor, who is awarded this powerful position
based on high status (e.g., experience with an innovative solution), then
mediates the relationship between the two sides of the ecosystem, i.e.,
customers and complementors.
By building on a technology architecture with low core-extension
coupling, a horizontal platform is an organizational form that distributes
decision rights among ecosystem complementors and therefore gives
them relatively equal opportunities for value capture. In contrast to
vertical and horizontal platforms, a modular platform is a hybrid orga-
nizational form comprised of possible parallel architecture-governance
configurations, each of which can embrace a different form. In the MSI
case, one module reflected the vertical platform organization, whereas
another module took on the form of the horizontal organization during
the platform’s modular configuration.
Consistent with assumptions in the platform literature (Gawer,
2014; Jacobides et al., 2018), our analysis reveals that each of these
architecture-governance configurations produces different degrees of
complementor engagement. For example, while relatively low com-
plementor engagement was produced by the vertical platform organi-
zation, complementor engagement was relatively high in the horizontal
configuration. As part of the modular platform organization, the de-
velopment of a set of route optimization modules by a company with
requisite expertise evolved into a vertical architecture-governance
configuration that rendered a relatively low degree of complementor
engagement. Even though the prior development of the order man-
agement module with its more established functionality reflected a
horizontal configuration that produced relatively high levels of com-
plementor engagement, the momentum of the shared platform as a
whole was eroded because of the low engagement of complementors
that surrounded the route optimization modules.
This finding points to the importance of maintaining consistency of
architecture and governance across a platform where one com-
plementor might draw on multiple modules (Wareham et al., 2014). By
conceptualizing our findings and noting other patterns that emerged
through our imbricational analysis, we now summarize our findings in
four propositions to stimulate future research on platform organizations
and complementor engagement.
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Proposition 1. A vertical platform organization produces low
complementor engagement
This proposition captures not only the relationship between the
organizational form we label vertical platform and complementor en-
gagement, but also the relationship between the platform architecture
and the governance mechanism of allocating key control points to a
single complementor (Dattée et al., 2018; de Reuver et al., 2018). By
granting decision authority in a shared platform to a single actor, this
complementor’s position is elevated vis-à-vis the other service providers
on the platform (Pagani, 2013; Wareham et al., 2014). Given that this
elevated complementor is nevertheless a competitor, this renders un-
certain other complementors’ ability to distinguish themselves on the
platform and to capture value. This uncertainty, in turn, limits the re-
source commitments that complementors make to the collective en-
deavor of developing a shared platform.
Our analysis also shows that this governance mechanism is tied up
with the platform architecture. In the MSI case, the high core-extension
specificity of the OSGi architecture found expression in a client-side
JAR files that could be updated remotely by the OSGi server when
changes in the platform’s core needed to be accommodated. This pre-
sented a significant security vulnerability for complementors.
Furthermore, the OSGi architecture exhibited low interface conform-
ability as it relied on global data structures that were specifically tai-
lored to each IT vendor’s system. In addition to being non-standard, the
interface was also poorly documented.
To make such an architecture of high synergistic specificity and low
interface conformability work in a platform that brings together diverse
complementors, the architecture’s control point, i.e., its source of value
and/or power, must be allocated to a trusted party (Dattée et al., 2018;
Pagani, 2013). Trust in the platform provider who has the capacity to
make changes remotely to a complementor’s infrastructure, is a key
condition for the platform organization’s viability. Thus, the material
agency of the OSGi architecture necessitated the governance me-
chanism of allocating the control point (namely the ongoing operation
of the core) to a trusted party.
In the case of MSI, Vehco, the company whose EcoHauler prototype
had initiated the formation of the platform by bringing key players in
the industry together, was granted authority over the core. Its elevated
status was based on its experience with a solution – however limited –
which proved that a platform was a viable solution for integrating the
transport firms’ three islands of technology. However, Vehco’s effective
ownership of the core meant that customers’ (i.e., road haulers) were
likely to perceive Vehco as their integration provider, as Vehco would
mediate other complementors’ client relationships. The competitive
threat this vertical architecture-governance configuration posed, meant
that complementor engagement was challenged.
This relationship between a vertical configuration and com-
plementor engagement appears to be highly relevant to blockchain
platforms (Beck et al., 2018), which represent a new type of shared
platform, whose architecture is considerably different from the way in
which shared platforms have traditionally been implemented. Never-
theless, blockchain-based platforms are likely to be governed in highly
centralized ways, especially when they are first developed. The com-
plementor with all the decision rights emerges as a “benevolent dic-
tator” in blockchain platforms (Beck et al., 2018). In the face of a
platform monopoly developing (Eisenmann, 2008), complementors’
willingness to commit resources to the platform is likely to diminish.
An example of this situation is the Maersk blockchain project,
TradeLens (Lal and Johnson, 2018). Intended to tie all the participants
in global supply chains together (i.e., suppliers, 3rd party logistics
providers, inspectors, customs, etc.), this joint venture between Maersk
and IBM has struggled to secure the degree of industry-wide adoption
needed to deliver the anticipated efficiency and value (Lal and Scott,
2018). In particular, with Maersk being a complementor on this plat-
form, its competitors have been hesitant to join TradeLens because they
are worried that Maersk, as a majority stakeholder in the platform’s
joint venture, will have access to their confidential trade data. Parti-
ciation would thus risk strengthening Maersk’s competitive position.
Furthermore, given that this blockchain platform is subject to winner
take all dynamics (Eisenmann, 2008), complementors might be better
off by participating in the construction of a shared platform, in which
the incentives of the platform and the complementors are aligned.
Proposition 2. A horizontal platform organization produces high
complementor engagement
The key difference between a vertical and a horizontal platform
configuration lies in the ownership of the architectural control points.
While in the vertical platform one complementor emerges as the
dominant player, a horizontal platform organization relies on govern-
ance mechanisms that allocate control points more or less evenly across
the complementors. By creating a more egalitarian decision-making
environment, complementors’ interests are more aligned with those of
the platform as a whole, creating the economic incentives to commit
resources to complete the platform’s value proposition (Adner, 2017;
Jacobides et al., 2018).
It is however important to note that complementor engagement is
afforded by an architecture that exhibits low synergistic specificity.
With core-extension coupling being low, investments that com-
plementors make in developing a unique service offering on one plat-
form, should be readily reusable on another. In the case of the MSI
project, the WS architecture enabled complementors to develop their
extensions relatively independently, thus supporting generativity,
which in turn promised greater cross-side network effects and overall
platform success.
However, a likely consequence of a more egalitarian development
environment is an interface low in conformability despite an archi-
tecture (i.e., web services) that makes an unambiguous, clearly speci-
fied, well-documented and standardized interface possible (i.e., XML).
Fig. 5. Business Process Modules architecture and associated platform organization structure.
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In the MSI case, we saw that developing a highly conformable interface
was challenged by the fact that there was no platform owner to enforce
an architectural direction. Rather than dealing with the conflict that
accompanies the harmonization of parameters that constitute the
haulage industry’s XML schema and the prioritizations that this de-
manded, an inclusive approach that accommodates the integration
needs of all complementors materialized. As a result, the interface be-
came bloated with considerable redundancies that created ambiguities,
increased the burden of documentation, and raised the cost of im-
plementing MSI-based integration solutions.
This proposition highlights the intertwining of the material and
social dimension of the platform organization. An architecture with low
core-extension specificity means that barriers to entry are dissolved and
more software vendors are likely to seek access to the platform eco-
system (Boudreau, 2012; Jacobides et al., 2018). With increased com-
plementor participation and engagement, the resulting competitive
pressures lead complementors to seek differentiation (Ceccagnoli et al.,
2012; Cennamo et al., 2018). This, in turn, generates greater diversity
in the interface parameters, thereby reducing interface conformability.
However, since the interface conformability is the result of accom-
modating incumbent complementors’ specific system needs (thus re-
ducing their implementation costs) complementor engagement among
incumbents increases. However, low interface conformability reduces
the likelihood that new entrants will commit resources to the platform.
Equal opportunity to capture value from platform transactions, as well
as the ability to affect the design of the platform core and interface, is
likely to encourage greater complementor engagement in all types of
platforms, i.e., proprietary, shared and blockchain. Based on distributed
ledger technology and peer-based transaction processing, blockchain
platforms are built on the promise of decentralized, horizontal modes of
organizing. As Beck et al. (2018) point out, decentralized governance is
the goal of blockchain platform owners, who typically fulfill the cen-
tralized owner role in the initial phases of the platform’s development.
Even though typical governance mechanisms such as negotiations and
incentives are digitized in blockchain platforms (i.e., smart contracts and
tokens), agreeing on the rules that need to be digitized requires intensive
collaboration and negotiation among the complementors. The high
transaction costs this process entails, however mean that membership in
the core team has to be limited. Managing the success and growth of the
horizontal platform then generates challenges related to free-riding
(Eisenmann, 2008), as new entrants who have not contributed to the effort
of developing the platform nevertheless benefit from it.
Proposition 3. A modular platform organization produces
complementor engagement through parallel architecture-governance
configurations
A modular architecture is regarded as the most desirable in platform
development, as it spurs generativity and broaden the variety of com-
plements produced (e.g., de Reuver et al., 2018; Parker et al., 2017).
This is because an architecture with low core-extension synergistic
specificity and a highly conformable interface lowers the entry barriers
and allows new complementors to generate and capture value in ways
that are readily adaptable to change and reusable on other platforms.
However, such a platform architecture increases the competition among
complementors (Boudreau, 2012; Wareham et al., 2014), thereby in-
creasing negative same-side network effects. Thus, the attractiveness of
the platform’s architecture sets in motion a competitive mechanism that
militates against the very outcome (i.e., complementor engagement)
that it is expected to produce. To address this apparent paradox, plat-
form owners might endeavor to build a sensibility for collectivity
among the complementors (Boudreau, 2012; Wareham et al., 2014).
For example, complementors might be incentivized to create solutions
that benefit the platform as a whole, and a sense of collective identity
greater vision might be instilled in them.
The MSI Group pursued a strategy of incentives when it allocated
the right to make design decisions regarding the XML schema for three
of the four business process modules to DPS, a new entrant to the MSI
ecosystem. DPS had earned accolades for its route optimization soft-
ware outside of the Swedish road haulage space. Accorded decision
rights over the design of the XML schema for the three modules related
to route-optimization, DPS instantly inhabited a dominant position in
these modules’ development, despite being a newcomer to the platform
initiative.
DPS leveraged its decision authority, creating a vertical configura-
tion in the platform’s route optimization functionality. While DPS’
dominant position was expected to expedite the development of the
three new modules (Proposition 3) and to avoid the bloating of the
schemas that had occurred in the horizontal platform organization
(Proposition 2), engagement waned among the complementors.
Initially, it was the truck manufacturers that left due to their unwill-
ingness to provide more embedded parameters to the route optimiza-
tion modules. The exodus of these high-profile players then made the
MSI initiative less attractive to other complementors (Wareham et al.,
2014).
It is important to note, that even though a horizontal configuration
was apparent in the development of the more established order man-
agement module, the declining complementor engagement in the route-
optimization modules shrunk the network of providers so significantly,
that network effects were undermined and the MSI platform was de-
commissioned soon after. Managing a modular configuration thus re-
quires vigilance that each module – or functional sub-set of the platform
– generates sufficient complementor engagement. This is because the
loss of complements in one functional subset of the platform is likely to
undermine the platform’s network effects.
One risk of a modular platform configuration is that it might lead to
forking, i.e., copying existing code and then extending it in a way that
crates a distinct version separate from the original. Frequently asso-
ciated with blockchain platforms (Beck et al., 2018), forking, represents
a strategy for dealing with the increased competitiveness of platforms
enacting a modular architecture. The more complementors seek to
differentiate themselves within the blochchain platform, the more
likely they are to develop proprietary extensions. This implies that the
platform is likely to become increasingly fragemented, which under-
mines the achieving critical mass and network effects in any of the
modules or forks.
Proposition 4. Elevating to leadership positions those complementors
with prior experience in the functionality a shared platform seeks to
develop, expedites the platform’s evolution in the short term, but also
limits complementor engagement in the long term.
The development of a shared platform necessitates engagement of a
diverse set of complementors whose interests may be orthogonal to
each other (e.g., Jacobides et al., 2018). This heterogeneity of interests
presents formidable challenges for the collaborative endeavor of de-
veloping a shared platform. For example, governance costs are likely to
increase as a diverse set of complementors try to come to agreement
(Eisenmann, 2008).
The MSI case highlights a pragmatic solution to this challenge. By
starting the design process with a viable solution, e.g., a working pro-
totype, that can then be collectively adapted, the complementor eco-
system is more likely to development a functional platform core (Dattée
et al., 2018). Having something tangible (e.g., code, data structures) to
focus the complementors’ attention and to align their diverging goals, is
particularly helpful in shared platforms that require consensus among
members.
However, allocating architectural authority to individual com-
plementors is likely to produce vertical platform configurations, which
reduce complementor engagement in the longer term (Proposition 1).
This suggests that the success of shared platform design depends on the
consortium’s ability to switch from a vertical configuration that accel-
erates technological development in the short term, to a horizontal
configuration that promotes complementor engagement, collective
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identity, generativity and network effects in the long term. How to
recognize the optimal point when to pivot from one platform config-
uration to another might present an opportunity for future research.
8. Contributions to research and practice
While recent platform research has paid increasing attention to the
intertwining of technology architecture and governance mechanisms,
this research is largely limited to proprietary platforms and their as-
sociated business models (e.g., Cennamo et al., 2018; Kapoor and
Agarwal, 2017). This means that the current understanding of how
complementor engagement is produced mainly concerns ecosystem
orchestration efforts of platform owners once the platform architecture-
governance configuration has been developed. As a result, there re-
mains much to be learned about configuring platform organizations and
engaging complementors in value creation and capture (Adner, 2017;
Jacobides et al., 2018). This is particularly salient for building block-
chain platforms (Beck et al., 2018), which reflect the tenets of shared
platforms. In fact, tokenization and smart contracts, which digitize
governance mechanism that would otherwise be enacted manually,
hold considerable promise for making shared platforms economically
viable.
Despite the existence of a handful of studies that explore the de-
velopment and evolution of shared platforms (e.g., Eisenmann et al.,
2011; Jha et al., 2016) where complementor engagement is part of the
platform from its inception (Dattée et al., 2018) – meaning that it can
be studied over time – none of these studies offers a process perspective
on how the technological and social aspects of the platform’s config-
uration reciprocally shape one another and what effect this has on
complementor engagement. Indeed, conceptualizing platforms as or-
ganizational forms represents a novel perspective on platforms (Gawer,
2014), which directs our attention towards an understanding of the
antecedents of complementor engagement in a holistic manner, rather
than as a list of individual factors (e.g., Cennamo et al., 2018; Kazan
et al., 2018).
Providing insight into how architecture and governance intertwine
to form particular configurations that afford greater and lesser degrees
of complementor engagement in shared platforms, constitutes our
study’s primary contribution to platform research. We capture these
insights in the first three propositions, which do not only identify three
distinct platform organizations (i.e., vertical, horizontal, and modular),
but also explain how they emerge through the interplay between social
and technical aspects of organizing. Additionally, we discuss the ben-
efits and challenges that each of these organizational forms pose for
complementor engagement. For example, while the vertical platform is
likely to achieve a temporal alignment among the complementors, and
therefore lead to the speedy development of an initial architectural
core, it fails to provide the necessary incentives for most com-
plementors to commit resources to co-produce the platform’s value.
This nuanced understanding of the interaction between architecture
and governance and its implications for complementor engagement
provides novel insights to the extant platform literature (Adner, 2017;
Dattée et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018). It also raises new research
questions including: When should a horizontal architecture-governance
configuration, which is useful for the effective development of an in-
novation initially, be superseded by a vertical organizational form that
is more conducive to producing longer-term complementor engage-
ment? What organizational form should a shared platform move to in
order to ensure that a core-extension interface with high conformability
is assured? How might the architecture-governance configurations of
the different functional modules in a modular platform organization be
managed so that their inherent diversity does not compromise same-
side network effects over time?
These research questions also point to our study’s implications for
practitioners. A key insight our study offers is that managing com-
plementor engagement is akin to a choreographed dance, where one
technical move is followed by a social one to create a continuous
evolutionary flow. Platform owners should not only be prepared to pre-
emptively shift from one architecture-governance configuration to an-
other such that the weaknesses of one configuration are addressed by
the capabilities of the next (Proposition 4), but also throughout the
development process, shift design priorities among the different sta-
keholder groups constituting the sides of the platform market.
As the interest in blockchain based platforms grows (e.g., Beck
et al., 2018), our study provides important insights into what it takes to
achieve the aspirational model of a vertical platform configuration.
Even though blockchain’s distributed ledger infrastructure differs sig-
nificantly from the technology on which MSI was built, the configura-
tions identified in this paper appear to be materializing in the block-
chain space, e.g., the “benevolent dictator” who becomes the defacto
platform owner (Beck et al., 2018) reflects the vertical platform con-
figuration. By focusing on the challenges of distributed management
throughout a shared platform’s evolution and its ongoing operation, we
focus on a phenomenon worthy of further scrutiny (de Reuver et al.,
2018; Nambisan, 2017).
9. Limitations
These research contributions need to be qualified by our study’s
limitations. First, limited to a single shared platform effort based on
specific technologies within a particular industry, we examine the
collective work of a restricted group of complementors in the Swedish
road haulage industry that focused on the development of the MSI
platform. Our analysis is thus concerned with the specific issues en-
countered in this context, as well as the approaches, processes, and
tools used to develop a specific platform. Claims of cross-case gen-
eralizability to other empirical contexts are thus misplaced.
However, our study does achieve within-case generalizability (Lee
and Baskerville, 2003). By developing a process perspective of plat-
forms as architecture-governance configurations, drawing on an ex-
tensive exploration of the prior literature on complementor engage-
ment, and reading our data through this theory (and vice versa), we
achieve generalization from empirical description to theory. As a result
of our reliance on abduction for our data analysis – and its toggling
between induction and deduction – our research results promise to be
both testable and empirically valid, especially for designers and leaders
of platform organizations.
Second, given the longitudinal nature of the 12-year case study we
are analyzing, the data’s diversity and volume raises legitimate ques-
tions about the completeness and accuracy of the record. To address
concerns over data quality, we have relied on a number of techniques,
including developing detailed timelines, applying different lenses to our
data analysis (e.g., the relationships among complementors across the
three phases of development). Additionally, based on their proximity to
the actual MSI project and the data representing it, the three co-authors
took on different roles throughout the data analysis.
The first author who had limited involvement in the MSI project
(i.e., she was part of the module development team in the BPM phase)
focused on analyzing the data. The second author had the most intimate
knowledge of the project due to his involvement as its project manager
on and off across the MSI’s 12-year existence. He was able to fill in gaps
in the data record and provide the contextual background (including
actors’ emotional states) to help us make meaning of certain events. The
third author, who had not been directly involved in the project, focused
on asking questions of the data and the two co-authors’ interpretations.
She continuously challenged the other authors to provide coherent
explanations of and evidence for events and their significance. While
this approach was laborious and circular, it supported our abductive
stance towards theorizing and gave us reasonable assurance of the re-
liability of our analysis.
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10. Conclusions
As organizational forms that rely on complementors to complete
them and to offer a compelling value proposition to their multi-sided
customer segments, shared platforms are compelled to develop and
maintain complementor engagement. Indeed, developing effective ar-
chitecture-governance configurations is crucial to this endeavor. Given
the recognition by the extant platform literature that there is much
more to learn about the implications of the interaction between a
platform’s technological architecture and its governance mechanisms
for engaging complementors, the focus of our paper is to advance a rich
understanding of how and why specific architecture-governance con-
figurations emerge in the evolution of a shared platform, and what their
respective implications are for complementor engagement.
In this paper, we identify three organizations forms – vertical, hor-
izontal, and modular platforms – each of which generates different degrees
of complementor engagement. Interestingly, however, each of these plat-
form organizations poses significant challenges for complementor engage-
ment. For example, even though the architecture-governance configuration
that represents the horizontal platform produced the most complementor
engagement in our study, the egalitarianism among complementors it en-
acted also promoted an architectural design characterized by low interface
conformability, which manifested itself in a bloated XML schema that in-
cluded the incumbents’ specific integration needs. While this elevated
complementor engagement among incumbents in the short term, it was
likely to make resource commitments unattractive to new complementors.
Thus, long-term complementor engagement would be in jeopardy. In the
form of four propositions, our paper captures these and other nuanced
insights about the reciprocal shaping of architecture and governance in
platform organizations and what its consequences are for engaging a cri-
tical mass of complementors. We hope that future research tests and dis/
confirms these in other empirical settings.
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